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Introduction:	Quantum	Mechanics,	the	physical	theory	describing	the	microworld,	
represents	one	of	science’s	greatest	triumphs.		It	lies	at	the	root	of	all	modern	digital	
technologies	and	offers	unparalleled	correspondence	between	prediction	and	
experiments.		Remarkably,	however,	after	more	than	100	years	it	is	still	unclear	what	
quantum	mechanics	means	in	terms	of	basic	philosophical	questions	about	the	nature	
of	reality.		While	there	are	many	interpretations	of	the	mathematical	machinery	of	
quantum	physics,	there	remains	no	experimental	means	to	distinguish	between	most	of	
them.		
	
In	this	contribution,	(based	on	a	discussion	at	the	NYAS),	I	wish	to	consider	the	ways	in	
which	the	enduring	lack	of	an	agreed	upon	interpretation	of	quantum	physics	influences	
a	number	of	critical	philosophical	debates	about	physics	and	reality.		I	briefly	review	two	
problems	effected	by	quantum	interpretations:	the	meaning	of	the	term	“Universe”	and	
the	nature	of	consciousness.		In	what	follows	I	am	explicitly	not	advocating	for	any	
particular	quantum	interpretation.		Instead,	I	am	interested	in	how	the	explicit	inability	
of	modern	physics	to	experimentally	distinguish	between	interpretations	with	wildly	
divergent	ontological/epistemological	implications	plays	into	discussions	of	physics	and	
its	description	of	the	world.	
Quantum	Mechanics	and	“Bits	of	Matter”:	Most	physics	students	come	to	their	college	
studies	expecting	the	discipline	to	provide	an	exacting	account	of	nature	such	as	they	
were	exposed	to	in	their	high	school	Newtonian	mechanics	based	classes.		Most	are,	
therefore,	shocked	when	they’re	introduced	to	quantum	mechanics	and	its	description	
of	the	world.		In	place	of	a	clear	vision	of	“little	bits	of	matter”,	quantum	physics	gives	us	
a	beautiful,	powerful	and	yet	seemly	paradoxical	calculus.		With	its	emphasis	on	
probability	waves,	essential	uncertainties	and	measurements	fundamentally	disturbing	
the	reality	they	seek	to	measure,	quantum	mechanics	makes	imagining	matter	in	a	
conventional	sense	all	but	impossible.		
This	situation	arose	at	beginning	of	the	last	century	when	physicists	found	Newtonian	
mechanics	failed	in	describing	the	micro-world	of	molecules,	atoms	and	their	
constituents.		In	a	burst	of	creativity,	they	devised	a	new	set	of	rules	embodied	in	what	
was	called	Schrodinger’s	Equation.		Like	Newton’s	F=ma,	Schrodinger’s	Equation	
represented	the	mathematical	machinery	for	describing	how	matter	responds	to	forces	
but	with	an	important	twist.		What	drops	out	of	Schrodinger’s	equation	is	not	the	
Newtonian	state	of	exact	position	and	velocity	but	something	called	the	wave-function	
(physicists	refer	to	it	as	ψ	or	“psi”).		Unlike	the	Newtonian	state	that	can	be	clearly	
imagined	in	a	common	sense	way,	the	wave	function	turned	out	to	pose	serious	
epistemological	and	ontological	challenges.			
While	it	was	easy	to	imagine	the	“thing”	described	in	Newtonian	physics	(a	particle	at	a	
specific	location	with	a	specific	velocity),	the	wave	function	leads	to	probabilities	living	
at	the	root	level	of	reality.		In	that	sense	ψ	appears	to	tell	you	that	any	moment	in	time,	
the	particle	has	many	positions	and	many	velocities.		In	effect	the	“little	bit	of	matter”	
so	essential	to	Newtonian	accounts	of	particles	was	smeared	out	into	set	of	potentials	
or	possibilities	whose	total	evolution	is	controlled	by	the	Schrodinger	equation.			
But	it’s	not	just	position	and	velocity	that	get	smeared	out.	The	wave-function	treats	all	
properties	of	the	particle	in	the	same	way	–	electric	charge,	energy,	the	direction	the	
particle’s	spin.	They	all	become	probabilities	holding	many	possible	values	at	the	same	
time.		Taken	at	face	value,	it’s	as	if	the	particle	doesn’t	have	definite	properties	at	all.		
This	is	what	Werner	Heisenberg,	one	of	the	founders	of	quantum	mechanics,	meant	
when	he	advised	people	not	to	think	of	atoms	as	“things”.		
But	this	is	not	the	end	of	the	trip	down	the	rabbit	hole.		According	to	the	standard	way	
of	treating	the	calculus	of	quantum	mechanics,	the	act	of	making	a	measurement	on	the	
particle	kills	off	all	pieces	of	the	wave	function	except	the	one	instruments	actually	
register.	The	wave-function	is	said	to	collapse	as	all	the	smeared	out,	potential	positions	
or	velocities	vanish	in	the	act	of	measurement.	It’s	as	the	Schrodinger	equation’s	
descriptive	authority	is	abruptly	halted	because	a	measurement	occurs.		
Thus	physicists	(and	philosophers)	were	left	with	two	kinds	of	strangeness	to	deal	with	
in	their	effort	to	understand	what	quantum	mechanics	tells	us	about	the	world.		What	
exactly	does	the	wave	function	describe?		What	really	occurs	in	a	measurement?		
Remarkably,	even	after	100	years,	a	path	through	these	difficulties	has	not	been	found.	
Quantum	Mechanics	and	Its	Interpretations:	There	are	many	interpretations	of	
quantum	theory	(Leifer	2014).		The	earliest	one	to	gain	force,	the	Copenhagen	
Interpretation,	is	associated	with	Danish	physicist	Neil’s	Bohr	and	other	founders	of	the	
discipline.		It	was	meaningless,	in	their	view,	to	speak	of	the	properties	of	atoms	in-and-
of-themselves.		Quantum	Mechanics	was	a	theory	that	spoke	only	to	our	knowledge	of	
the	world.		The	measurement	problem	highlighted	this	barrier	between	epistemology	
and	ontology	by	making	our	role	in	gaining	knowledge	explicit.			Others	were	not	so	
willing	to	give	up	on	an	objective	access	to	an	objective	world.		While	some	hoped	that	
so-called	hidden	variables	would	be	discovered	that	made	sense	of	quantum	weirdness,	
others	took	a	different	view.		In	the	so-called	Many	Worlds	Interpretation	(Everett	1957,	
1973)	the	authority	of	the	wave	function	and	its	governing	Schrodinger’s	Equation	was	
taken	as	absolute.		Measurements	don’t	suspend	the	equation	or	collapse	the	wave-
function,	it	merely	makes	the	Universe	split	off	into	many	parallel	versions	of	itself.		
The	problem	with	all	these	interpretations	is	that	remains	no	way	to	experimentally	
distinguish	between	them.		Which	one	you	choose	becomes	a	matter	of	philosophical	
temperament.	On	one	side	there	are	the	psi-ontologists	who	want	the	wave	function	to	
describe	the	objective	world	“out	there”.		On	the	other	side	there	are	the	psi-
epistemologists	who	see	the	wave-function	as	a	description	of	our	knowledge	(and	its	
limits:	Fuchs	&	Schack	2011).	The	battle-lines	between	these	positions	can	be	fierce	
precisely	because	there	is	no	way	to	answer	this	scientific	question	with	science	(at	least	
for	now).			
It’s	worth	noting	that	theoretical	“no-go”	theorems	can	be	quite	helpful	in	positing	
limits	that	different	interpretations	would	impose	on	experiments.		A	recent	example	is	
the	work	of	Pusey,	Barrett	&	Rudolph	(PBR	2011)	who	showed	that	certain	classes	of	
psi-epistemological	interpretations	can	be	ruled	out	(Harrigan	&	Spekkens	2010).		The	
PBR	theorem	showed	that	one	can’t	posit	the	existence	of	underlying	ontic	states	
(meaning	real	properties	of	the	world)	while	also	positing	that	the	wave	function	
doesn’t	fully	represent	those	states	(meaning	they	were	epistemic).		It	is	noteworthy,	
however,	that	the	PBR	theorem	does	not	address	what	might	be	called	“fundamentally	
epistemic”	interpretations	such	as	Copenhagen	or	neo-Copenhagen	models	(i.e.	QBism	
see	below)	
Quantum	Interpretations	and	its	Discontents	I.	The	Meaning	of	“Universe”.	
As	discussed,	the	Many-Worlds	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	finds	favor	with	
physicists	and	philosophers	who	advocate	for	an	ontic	view	of	their	equations.		For	them	
all	fundamental	equations	of	mathematical	physics	capture	aspects	of	a	timeless	reality	
belonging	to	the	Universe	itself.		This	position	is	deeply	ingrained	in	the	history	of	
physics.	Indeed	the	philosophical	basis	of	the	positions	extends	as	far	back	as	the	
Platonic	Doctrine	of	Ideals	whereby	the	world	we	perceive	is	but	a	shadow	of	
incorruptible	mathematical	forms	constituting	the	true	nature	of	reality.			
Given	the	enormous	success	of	mathematical	physics	in	revealing	unseen	aspects	of	the	
world’s	behavior,	it	is	easy	to	understand	the	emotional	force	of	this	kind	of	wave-
function	realism	(Ney	&	Albert	2013).		As	one	example,	consider	how	Maxwell’s	
equations	for	electromagnetics	revealed	the	presence	of	new	and	previously	
unimagined	forms	of	“light”	such	as	radio	waves.			
But	dealing	with	the	strangeness	of	quantum	mechanics	means	that	each	interpretation	
comes	with	its	own	price.		Each	one	forces	adherents	to	take	a	long	step	backwards	
from	the	kind	of	“naive	realism”	possible	with	the	Newtonian	word-view.	Thus	the	Many	
Worlds	Interpretation’s	ability	to	keep	reality	in	the	mathematical	physics	–	the	wave	
equation	–	means	it’s	adherents	must	accept	infinite	numbers	of	parallel	universes	that	
are	infinitely	splitting	off	into	an	infinity	of	other	parallel	universes.		While	the	idea	can	
seem	rich	and	exiting	to	some,	it	raises	a	fundamental	question	about	the	very	subject	
considered	by	Physics.		Science	is	taken	to	be	the	study	of	the	reality	we	have	access	to	
via	our	senses	and	the	instruments	we	build	to	extend	the	reach	of	those	senses.		
Without	experimental	justification,	adherents	of	the	Many	Worlds’	interpretation	are	
willing	to	enlarge	the	definition	of	Universe	to	include	realities	not	directly	accessible	to	
our	instruments.		This	is	done	to	satisfy	a	pre-existing	attitude	about	reification	of	the	
“mathematical	objects”	comprising	physical	theory.	
	
I	raise	this	point	not	to	argue	that	the	Many	Worlds	interpretation	is	wrong.		Instead	the	
point	is	that,	in	the	absence	of	an	experimentally	verified	interpretation,	it	appears	we	
remain	uncertain	about	something	as	fundamental	as	the	essential	subject	matter	of	
physics.		Do	our	equations	describe	the	Universe	we	see	or	do	they	describe	a	Universe	
of	infinitely	larger	and,	perhaps,	unobservable	possibilities	that	must	be	considered	
real?		Note	this	problem	is	fundamentally	distinct	from	discussions	about	a	Universe	of	
infinite	spatial	extent	of	which	our	observable	domain	constitutes	a	sub-region.		
	
Quantum	Interpretations	and	its	Discontents	II.	What	Matter	For	Mind?	
A	second	point	where	quantum	interpretations	become	relevant	is	the	relationship	
between	mind	and	matter	(Chalmers	2002).		In	the	fault	lines	for	this	debate	
materialism	holds	a	particular	kind	of	high	ground	in,	at	least,	the	public	versions	of	
discussions	over	that	the	nature	of	consciousness.		What	is	particularly	interesting	is	
that	when	taking	on	the	problem	of	Mind	and	Brain,	advocates	for	a	cosmos	fully	
reducible	to	matter	often	take	a	position	embodying	a	kind	“hard-nosed”	realism.		It	is	
in	light	of	such	confidence	that	those	who	advocate	the	alternative	-	that	Mind	might	be	
something	more	than	“nothing	but	bits	of	matter”	–	can	be	cast	as	victims	of	wishful	
thinking,	imprecise	reason,	or	worse,	an	adherence	to	the	domains	of	mystical	“woo”.		
But	the	unanswered	question	of	quantum	interpretations	leaves	materialists	in	an	
unexpectedly	shaky	position.		Rather	than	enjoying	the	high	ground	of	metaphysical	
certainty,	they	are	left	with	hard	choices	about	which	kinds	of	strangeness	they’re	
willing	to	swallow	as	we	have	already	encountered	with	the	Many	Worlds	interpretation.	
	
Of	course	there	is	a	big	price	to	pay	for	the	fundamental	psi-epistemologist	positions	too.		
Physics	from	their	perspective	is	not	longer	a	description	of	the	world	in-and-of	itself.		
Instead	it's	a	description	of	the	rules	for	our	interaction	with	the	world.		A	particularly	
cogent	new	version	of	the	psi-epistemological	position,	called	Quantum	Bayseanism	or	
QBism	(Fuchs,	Mermin	&	Schack	2014),	raises	this	perspective	to	new	levels	of	
specificity	by	taking	the	probabilities	in	quantum	mechanics	at	face	value.		According	to	
QBism,	the	irreducible	probabilities	in	quantum	mechanics	tell	us	it’s	really	a	theory	
about	making	bets	on	the	world’s	behavior	(via	our	measurements)	and	then	updating	
our	knowledge	after	those	measurements	are	done.	In	this	way	QBism	points	explicitly	
to	our	failure	to	include	the	observing	subject	that	lies	at	root	of	quantum	weirdness.		As	
physicist	David	Mermin	recently	wrote	in	Nature	“QBism	attributes	the	muddle	at	the	
foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	to	our	unacknowledged	removal	of	the	perceiving	
subject	from	physical	science.”	(Mermin	2014)			
	
How	does	the	dichotomy	between	psi-epistemological	and	psi-ontic	positions	play	into	
debates	about	consciousness?		The	answer	can	be	found	in	the	definition	of	the	Hard	
Problem	of	Consciousness	first	articulated	by	David	Chalmers	(Chalmers	2002).		
Following	work	by	Thomas	Nagel,	Chalmers	pointed	to	the	vividness	–	the	intrinsic	
presence	-	of	the	perceiving	subject’s	experience	as	a	problem	that	no	current	
explanatory	account	of	consciousness	seems	capable	of	embracing.		
	
While	some	see	the	Hard	Problem	as	real	but	inherently	unsolvable,	others	posit	a	range	
of	options	for	its	account.		Consciousness	may,	for	example,	be	an	example	of	the	
emergence	of	a	new	entity	in	the	Universe	not	contained	in	the	laws	of	particles.		There	
is	also	the	more	radical	possibility	that	some	rudimentary	form	of	consciousness	must	
be	added	to	the	list	of	things	the	world	is	build	of,	like	mass	or	electric	charge.			But	for	
Daniel	Dennett	(2002)	and	other	who	hold	a	strict	materialist	view	these	ideas	are	dead	
ends.	As	Michu	Kaku	wrote	in	his	recent	book	“…there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	Hard	
problem”	(Kaku	2014).		For	this	kind	of	public	materialism,	consciousness	is	just	
programing	that	sits	on	top	of	wiring	that	sits	on	top	of	“bits	of	matter”.		
	
It	is	however	hard	to	reconcile	this	kind	of	easy	materialist	dismissal	of	the	Hard	
Problem	with	quantum	mechanics	and	its	multiple	interpretations.		The	reasons	why	
Dennett	and	Kaku’s	kind	of	position	becomes	shaky	are	twofold	and	have	nothing	to	
with	whether	or	not	Newtonian	mechanics	might	be	fine	for	explaining	the	activity	of	
the	brain.	
	
First,	the	difference	between	the	psi-ontological	and	psi-epistemological	positions	is	so	
fundamental	that	without	knowing	which	one	is	correct	it’s	impossible	to	know	what	
quantum	mechanics	is	intrinsically	referring	to.		Imagine	for	a	moment	that	something	
like	the	QBist	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	were	true.		If	this	emphasis	on	the	
observing	subject	was	the	correct	lesson	to	learn	from	our	most	powerful	description	of	
matter,	then	the	standard	view	of	materialism	and	its	perspective	on	Mind	and	Matter	
would	seem	to	lose	its	force.		If	QBism	were	true,	there	may	be	enormous	surprises	
waiting	for	us	in	our	exploration	of	subject	and	object,	including	additions	to	what	
entities	must	be	included	in	any	account	of	Mind.	Dennett’s	kind	of	materialism	-	being	
a	particular	form	of	psi-ontology	–	would	by	necessity	be	blind	to	these	kinds	of	
additions.		
	
Indeed,	without	an	experimentally	verifiable	interpretation	of	quantum	physics,	the	role	
of	“perspective”	in	physics	remains	an	interesting	open	issue.		This	comes	because	
measurement	plays	such	a	central	role	in	what	is	not	understood	about	quantum	theory.		
This	is	quite	different	from	a	classical	theory	like	Relativity.		There	observers	also	take	a	
central	position	but	in	an	objectively	deterministic	framework.		
	
Indeed	philosopher	of	physics	Michael	Bitbol	(REF)	uses	the	locus	of	uncertainty	
surrounding	quantum	interpretations	as	one	line	of	argument	that	conscious	experience	
must	treated	as	primary.		By	“primary”	he	means	all	codifications	scientific	knowledge	
begin	via	abstractions	of	experience.		As	he	puts	it,	“Conscious	experience	as	a	whole	
can	by	no	means	be	reduced	to	structure”	where	structure	implies	sets	of	laws	and	their	
initial	conditions.		Bitbol’s	presents	six	arguments	that	conscious	experience	cannot	
derive	from	a	material	basis,	the	last	of	which	rests	on	the	philosophy	of	quantum	
mechanics.		
	
Conclusion:	Given	the	difficulties	discussed	in	the	paper,	one	has	to	ask	why	some	of	the	
weird	alternatives	suggested	by	quantum	interpretations	are	to	be	preferred	over	weird	
alternatives	suggested	by	others.		Why	does	the	infinity	of	(potentially	unobservable)	
parallel	Universes	in	the	Many	Worlds	Interpretation	get	associated	with	the	sober,	
hard-nosed	position	a	‘la	Dennett	(who	favors	it),	while	including	the	perceiving	subject	
is	condemned	being	anti-scientific	or	an	embrace	of	mysticism?	
	
Indeed,	in	the	absence	of	experimental	evidence	we	are	left	with	a	range	of	possible	
visions	for	quantum	mechanics’	implications	for	reality	that	a	tally	of	votes	at	the	next	
American	Physical	Society,	(or	American	Philosophical	Society),	won’t	resolve.	While	
some	interpretations	may	be	more	complete	and	coherent	than	others	(this	is	the	good	
work	of	good	philosophy)	in	the	end	we	remain	bereft	of	our	quaint	imaginings	about	
little	bits	of	matter.	
	
In	this	article	I	have	pointed	out	two	examples	of	how	the	lack	of	an	accepted	or,	better	
yet,	experimentally	verified	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	leads	to	an	extreme	
range	of	philosophically	divergent	positions	concerning	the	nature	of	reality	and	our	
place	in	it.			One	of	the	many	lessons	to	be	learned	from	this	situation	is	the	caution	that	
must	be	taken	concerning	strident	metaphysical	positions	and	claims	they	are	based	on	
“what	physics	tells	us”.		In	truth,	the	dogged	agnosticism	of	quantum	mechanics	to	its	
own	philosophical	implications	leave	everyone	–	materialists,	physicalists	and	idealists	–	
on	remarkably	shaky	ground.	
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